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CONGRESSIONAL SUPERVISION OF INTERSTATE
COMPACTS
In 1960, the Port of New York Authority announced plans to build
a jetport in New Jersey.1 Spurred by objections from residents, a House
Judiciary Subcommittee began investigating2 charges that the proposal
overstepped the Port Authority's power. 3 Since the Authority had
been created by an interstate compact requiring congressional ap-
proval, the subcommittee thought Congress had ample jurisdiction to
investigate.4 The Authority disagreed. Refusing to answer a subpoena,"
Executive Director Austin Tobin argued that Congress could scru-
tinize compacts only before it approved them." Congress, he reasoned,
had no legitimate concern with the Port Authority's operations once
the compact had been approved.
The Port Authority's extraordinary claim-that it was immune
from direct congressional control-had the support of several scholars7
and a Senate committee.8 But the claim was never tested. After the
Port Authority director was convicted of contempt of Congress,0 the
1. See United States v. Tobin, 195 F. Supp. 588, 595 (D.D.C. 1961), rev'd, 306 F.2d 270
(D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 902 (1962).
2. The House Judiciary Committee is charged by Congress with the duty of writing and
reviewing legislation concerned with interstate compacts. Congressmen Celler proposed
H.R.J. Res. 615, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960) requiring (1) that Congress approve in advance
any legislation by two states amending or supplementing existing compacts, (2) that
reports made to the states by compact authorities also be made to Congress, and (3) that
Congress have the right to see any "relevant" information and to view any authority
facility. See United States v. Tobin, 195 F. Supp. at 595.
3. Inquiry Before Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Committee on the Judiciary on
the Return of Subpoenas, Port of New York Authority, 86th Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 20, at 15
(1960) [hereinafter cited as Subcommittee Subpoena Inquiry]. See United States v. Tobin,
195 F. Supp. at 594.
4. See Subcommittee Subpoena Inquiry.
5. The records which the subcommitte sought concerned the internal managing,
financing and decisional processes of the Authority. Celler, Congress, Compacts, and Inter-
state Authorities, 26 LAw & CONTEIP. PROB. 682, 696 n.103 (1961).
6. Subcommittee Subpoena Inquiry 16-19.
7. See Note, 31 FORDHAM L. Rxv. 581 (1963); Note, 17 N.Y.U. INTrA. L. REV. 95 (1962)
Note, 8 Vi.. L. Rv. 237 (1963); Note, 70 YALE L.J. 812 (1961). But see FiLtEERsucI L
ZIMMERMANN & MITCHELL WENDELL, THE INTERSTATE COMPACT SINCE 1925, 64 (1951).
8. S. RE,. No. 1367, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 2, 18-19 (1958).
9. H. Res. 530, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960), amending, H. Res. 27, 86th Cong., Ist Sess.
(1960); Hearings Before Subcommittee No. 5 of the House Judiciary Committee, 86th Cong.,
2d Sess. 20 (1960). In support of Tobin's position, twenty-one states filed an amicus brief,
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Court of Appeals reversed 0 on technical grounds11 to avoid the consti-
tutional question 2 and the jetport plan was shelved.a3 The ansver
must be found in an examination of the Compacts Clause, in both
its original setting and its modem context.
14
The Constitution permits states, with congressional approval, to
form compacts in order to solve common problems.15 In colonial times
and throughout the nineteenth century, compacts were used to fix
boundaries and attack small-scale problems through cooperative action.
The subject matter was usually of little national importance, and once
compacts had been ratified Congress seldom attempted to oversee their
operation. During this period the Supreme Court, in dicta accompany-
ing compacts cases, denied that Congress had any power to amend
or repeal compacts it had approved.1'
acting through the Attorney General of Florida. United States v. Tobin, 195 F. Supp. at
591-92. The court found that Congress had been exercising continuing controls over the
authority for years. The FAA had regulated its airports; the Corps of Engineers, its bridge
and tunnel construction; and Congress had granted it substantial sums of money. The court
also found all technical requirements for valid congressional investigation and subpoena
had been fulfilled. 195 F. Supp. 598-603. The court made extensive use of Braden v.
United States, 565 US. 431 (1961); Watkins v. United States, 354 US. 178 (1957); and
United States v. Rumeley, 345 US. 41 (1953), in finding that these requirements had been
met.
10. Tobin v. United States, 306 F.2d 270.
11. The ground was that Congress had not authorized as broad an investigation as the
subcommittee had attempted. Tobin v. United States, 306 F.2d at 276. Both briefs were
well over one hundred pages in length, and in each the issue upon which the case was
decided took about five pages. In the District Court, Judge Youngdale gave about three
pages of a thirty page opinion to the point. See Brief for Appellee, Brief for Appellant,
Tobin v. United States, 306 F.2d 270 (D.C. Cir. 1962). The Court ignored much evidence
to the contrary on this point. See Brief for Appellee, pp. 49-53, but see Brief for Appel-
lant, pp. 56-62.
12. A contempt of Congress prosecution is not the most practical method of inducing
courts to answer broad questions .. . when the answers sought necessarily demand
far-reaching constitutional adjudications. To avoid such constitutional holdings is
our duty.... [We] have adopted the policy... in order to obviate the necessity of
passing on serious constitutional questions.
306 F.2d at 274-75. The court noted it could find no dear precedent on the issue of
whether Congress had the right to repeal an interstate compact. 306 F.2d at 274. See
ZIMAMMANN 9- WENDELL, op. cit. supra note 7, at 40 n.171.
13. Celler, supra note 5, at 701.
14. This setting must be referred to since the courts have so often been unable to
distinguish types of compacts. The district and circuit courts in Tobin, for example.
characterized the compact as an "operational agency." 195 F. Supp. at 607; a "non-litigcous
method for settlement of.. . disputes," 195 F. Supp. at 606; a "bi.state agency." 306 F.2d
at 271; and an entity restoring to the states their original sovereignty, 306 F.2d at 273.
15. U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 10, cL. 3.
16. See text accompanying notes 51-55.
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Congressional laissez-faire was a sensible policy toward the innoc-
uous compacts of the nineteenth century. But modem compacts have
spawned mammoth independent authorities, 17 armed with political
powers and isolated from political control. Compact agencies are the
envy-and often the rival-of elected officials. They have been cri-
ticized for flouting local interests and national policy, and for vastly
exceeding their proper scope.' 8 But with their independent revenues,
multi-state jurisdiction, and freedom from public accountability, only
congressional scrutiny can bring them under control.10
While congressional power to control compacts has been debated at
length, both sides have neglected the most plausible instrument for
congressional control: the enumerated powers.2 0  As instruments
17. These authorities have grown with the growth of all-but.governmentally-unified
multistate areas which are often unable to deal with the complex problems resulting from
that growth. See Leach, Interstate Authorities in the United States, 26 LAw & CONTrP.
PROB. 666, 679 (1961), and the reluctance of the federal government to provide solutions
to regional problems. See RICHARD H. LEACH & REDDING S. SUOG, TlE ADMINISTRATION OF
INTERSTATE ComPAars 214-15 (1959). Examples of such compacts are the Port Authority
discussed at text accompanying notes 28-43 infra. See also Interstate Oil & Gas Compact, 73
Stat. 290 (1959); Gulf States Marine Fisheries Compact, 63 Stat. 70 (1949); Ohio River
Valley Water Sanitation Compact, 54 Stat. 752 (1940). Congress has been so anxious for the
states to use the compact device that many times they have legislated consent in advance of
state agreement to encourage that agreement. See, e.g., Interstate Compact for Airport
Facilities, 73 Stat. 333 (1959), Federal Civil Defense Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 1245, 1249 (1951).
Between 1789 and 1900 only twenty-one interstate compacts became effective. LEACH AND
SUGG, op. cit. supra, at 6. See also McDOUGAL AND ROTIVAL, TIlE CASE FOR REGIONAL
PLANNING WrrH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO NEW ENGLAND 25-52 (1947), defining the New
England state as a single interstate region with the same problems, united by history,
culture, climate, power, and transportation. There are approximately thirty interstate
urban areas in the United States. See UNITED STATES BUREAU OF TIlE CENSUS, STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 14-15, 17 (1964).
18. See, e.g., Netherton, Area-Development Authorities: A New Form of Government
by Proclamation, 8 VAND. L. REv. 678 (1955).
19. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 64-69 supra.
20. This Note is not concerned with the right of Congress to condition its original
approval of a compact upon changes in its wording, etc. Much of what is said will
necessarily apply to such compacts and to those to which federal agencies are active
parties; however, the thrust of the argument will be directed at those compacts to which
Congress has already given assent and to which the federal government is not a party.
It should also be mentioned that litigation of the issues discussed here generally ought
to be avoided if possible, since it will likely cause severe federal-state frictions. Rather,
political adjustment ought to be the preferred solution to problems concerning compacts.
Continuous and creative administration is needed; not litigation, necessarily a
sporadic process, securing at best merely episodic and mutilated settlements, which
leave the central problems ... unsolved.
Frankfurter and Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution-A Study in Interstate
Adjustments, 34 YAr L. J. 685, 707 (1925). Further, the courts probably lack the time and
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through which state power is exercised across state boundaries, com-
pacts are peculiarly subject to the authority of Congress to guarantee
the primacy of federal interests.
I. Ti MODERN COMPACT IN PERSPECTVE
The activities of the Port Authority of New York, the largest and
most self-willed of the regional agencies, illustrate the potential of
the modem compact.2 1 It was created after a half-century of futility,2
the inevitable product of forty governments' attempts to regulate New
York's harbor traffic.23 Originally, the Authority was given power to
build, operate and coordinate transportation facilities throughout the
metropolitan area.24 Thanks to liberal construction of the compact,
its powers multiplied. The Authority now borrows and issues bonds
to raise capital funds..2 5 It budgets its revenues and enters into con-
tracts without legislative approval. It controls its own internal or-
ganization and is immune from civil service laws.20 It can issue sub-
poenas and its patrolmen are recognized as police in both New York
and New Jersey.27 It spends more money than four states,2 8 its debt is
greater than that of twenty-one others,2 0 and its assets are larger than
all but fifty American industrial firms.AO It owns, operates, rents,
builds and buys, all on its own recommendation, office buildings, rail-
road lines, warehouse facilities, and the like.31 Operating authority is
vested in a single director whose decisions are virtually unreviewable
expertise to settle the underlying issues even if raised. See FRELUND, ON UNDEPST.A'D|NC
Tmu SUPrmm COURT 77-116 (1949); West Virginia ex rel. Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22, 26-27
(1951).
21. It is often noted as the first of this sort of independent interstate compact authority.
See ZIMimEmANN & WENDELL, op. cit. supra note 7, at 5.
22. The compact was approved by Congress in H.R.J. Res. 337, 67th Cong., 2d Se.s.
(1922).
23. This early history is taken from two sources, ERWiN W. B.,R, TnE PORT OF NEW
YoRu Aum~orry 7-12 (1942) and Goldstein, An Authority in Action, 26 LAw & Co.%nTMP.
PROB. 715, 716 (1961). See also The New York Harbor Case, 47 I.C.C. 643 (191 ).
24. BARD, op. cit. supra note 23, at 40, 46-50, 54.
25. Id. at 57, 272-80.
26. Id. at 269, 272-80; 1960 PoRT OF Nuw YoRK AuTHOPTry ANN. REP. 61 (1960).
27. Nichol, The Port of New York Authority, p. 61, 1935 (unpublished manuscript in
Yale Law School Library).
28. Compare 1961 STATISTICAL ABSTRAcr OF THE UNrITD STATES 410 with 1960 PoRT oF
Nmv YORK AUTmHoirry ANN. REP. 61.
29. Compare 1961 STATISTICAL ABsTmRcr OF THE UNrED STATES 412 with 1960 PonT or
Nuw YoRn AuTrrHOR ANN. REP. 7, 61.
30. Goldstein, supra note 23, at 715.
31. BARD, op. cit. supra note 23, at 140-60, 269, 272-80.
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by either state.32 The result,3 according to many critics, is political ir-
responsibility:
[The Authority] does not make its decisions to build another tun-
nel, or to expand an airport instead of investing in mass-transit
facilities, in terms of the whole public, or of the interest of the
whole area .... It makes its decisions in terms of ... the auto
driver who keeps it going with his tolls, and the bond market....
[1]ike many another authority, ostensibly "non-political," [it] has
developed a politics of its own . . . [which] may or may not be
responsive to the public interest.3 4
The Port Authority has also found itself in direct conflict with fed-
eral policies. The Bureau of Roads, for one, has complained that the
Authority's use of toll revenues from bridges and roads for investment
in all the Authority's collateral activities contravenes a clear federal
policy that once roads have paid for themselves they should be free for
all users in interstate commerce.35
The Port of New York Authority's proposed $525 million World
Trade Center for Lower Manhattan illustrates the potential for con-
flict between compacts and communities. The proposal features two
one-hundred-and-ten story office buildings that would be the tallest in
the world.3 6 Offices would be occupied by the Authority, and space
would be rented out to concerns engaged in world trade. There were
32. Above the Director is a Board of Commissioners whose members are appointcd to
six-year terms by the Governors of New York and New Jersey. They serve without pay
and are predominantly businessmen. Their terms are usually renewed and, for all
practical effects, they do little reviewing of the Director's decisions. Resoultions in the
minutes of the Board's meetings can be vetoed by either Governor within ten days after
voted upon by the Commissioners, but within the forty years of the Authority's existence
this has happened but once. Board members arc usually reappointed and some have served
for as long as twenty years. The members have become so unresponsive to state claims on
the Authority that they have been subject to criticism by the Governors of the states, Id.
at 267, 269-70, 272-80, 282-84, 289. N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1934, p. 8, col. 1 (city ed.); and Jan.
16, 1935, p. 4, col. 8 (city ed.).
33. The Port Authority is not unique in the power it has attained. The Delaware River
Basin Compact, consented to by Congress in 1961, has the potential to develop Into an
independent authority with the power and scope of the Port of New York Authority. It is
charged with the financing, building and operating of water supply, power generation.
conservation and recreation facilities in a four-state area in which twenty-one million
persons live.
See FREDER cK L. ZIMMERMANN 9 MITCHE.LL VENDELL, NEW HORIZONS ON THE DELAWARE
(1963) (pamphlet); see also MARTIN, BIRKHEAD, BURKHEAD & MUNGER, RIVER BASIN AniMINIS.
TRATION AND THE DELAWARE (1960); Dixon, Constitutional Bases for Regionalism, 33 GEo.
WASH. L. REv. 47, 61 (1964); Note, 35 COLUM. L. REv. 76, 85-86 (1935).
34. New Strength in City Hall, Fortune, Nov., 1957, p. 156, at 256.
35. Netherton, supra note 18, at 689-90.
36. N.Y. Times, Mar. 29, 1965, p. 1, col. 4 (city ed.).
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many objections; businessmen and local residents envisioned a mas-
sive relocation and the destruction of the center of New York's elec-
tronics industry; 37 a New York State legislative committee charged
that office rental exceeded the scope of the Authority's power;38 archi-
tecture critics alleged that the Center would disfigure the Lower Man-
hattan skyline; 39 the Mayor, the City Council, and citizens' group
suggested that the money could be better spent on more pressing city
needs,40 the City Council President urged that public hearings be
held on the Trade Center.41 Despite these objections, however, New
York City was almost powerless to oppose the Trade Center. The
Authority's power to borrow money, issue bonds, condemn land and
choose the architectural design was subject to neither federal nor local
veto. The City's only power over the Authority was to refuse to issue
street closing and utility placement permits for the Trade Center
construction. - Ultimately the conflict between New York City and
the Authority, which centered on the payment to be made to the
city in lieu of real estate taxes, was resolved; 43 but the power of the
Authority to reshape unilaterally the architectural and economic life
of New York City was left unchallenged. This Port Authority is a
dramatic illustration of the new uses of the compact device-uses
which have rendered the aged dicta on compacts a misleading anach-
ronism.
87. New York's famed "radio row," a conglomeration of much of the city's electronics
retailing and wholesaling industry, was centered in the area the Port of Neiv York
Authority condemned. N.Y. Times, Mar. 29, 1965, p. 1, coL 4 (city ed.); and Sept. 11, 1965,
p. 15, col. 4 (city ed.).
88. N.Y. Times, Oct. 28, 1965, p. 87, col. 4 (city ed.); and Jan. 31, 1966, p. 29, col. 5 (city
ed.).
39. See Notes 30, 31, 36 supra. Some of the severest criticisms of the project were
directed at its aesthetic characteristics. To many critics the huge twin towers seem grossly
out of scale with other architecture on the Lower West Side of New York. See Harpers,
May, 1966, pp. 94-100.
40. N.Y. Times, Apr. 30, 1966, p. 58, col. 3 (city ed.); and May 27, 1966, p. 32, coL 2
(city ed.).
41. One of the most surprising aspects about the entire project was that it was clouded
in mystery and confusion simply because it was sprung upon the city as a fully developed
plan by the Port Authority. Unlike public agencies, the Authority is under no obligation to
make public its plans to the City of New York or its residents. Had such a project been
launched by the City it would have been subject to the most intense scrutiny. The consis-
tent complaint, by contrast, about the World's Trade Center project was that no one was
aware of the nature of the project during the planning phase of development. N.Y. Times,
Feb. 2, 1966, p. 38, col. 5 (city ed.); Feb. 16, 1966, p. 43, col. I (city ed.); Apr. 20, 1966, p. 30,
coL 1 (city ed.); Apr. 20, 1966, p. 53, col. 8 (city ed.).
42. N.Y. Times, July 13, 1966, p. 1, col. 2 (city ed.).
43. N.Y. Times, May 25, 1966, p. 32, col. I (city ed.); June 8, 1966, p. 1, cal. 2 (city ed.);
July 13, 1966, p. 1, col 2 (city ed.); and July 14, 1966, p. 20, coL 3 (city ed.).
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II. Tm HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF COMPACTS
AND COMPACTS CASE LAW
A. Boundary Disputes and Treaty Theory
The compact was first used to settle state boundary disputes arising
in the colonial and post-revolutionary eras. Such disputes between col-
onies were common, because of vague44 and expansive land charters, 45
and inaccurate surveying.46 As populations grew, rival claims became
more vexing.
47
The Constitution, reflecting the colonial difficulties in resolving
boundary disputes, provided two means for settlement. The states
could either sue one another in the Supreme Court and have it deter-
mine their boundary, 48 or reach their own agreements, subject to
congressional approval.
49
The compact device was based not only on the colonial precedent
of a negotiated settlement between the parties, but also on an analogy
between treaties and compacts that underlay the early cases. Treaties,
according to the influential writings of Hugo Grotius, were binding
44. See, e.g., JAMES T. ADAMfS, THE FOUNDING OF NEW ENGLAND 1665-1667, 216, 227, 320,
328 (1921); ALLAN NEvINs, THE AMmuCAN STATES 547, 578-79 (1924).
45. Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 660 (1838).
46. Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 508-09 (1893).
47. Several methods of settlement developed to cope with these colonial disputes. One
was direct negotiation and agreement between the parties. See, e.g., REGENTS OF TlHE
UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK, REPORT ON THE BOUNDAIUES OF NEw YORK 24-25 (1873); DICKINSON,
AMMCAN COLONIAL GOVERNMENT 288-90 (1912); see also Rhode Island v. Massachusetts,
supra note 45, at 663. The solutions reached were rarely permanent, however, since many
states were unwilling to abide by the negotiated agreements. Disputing colonies, wishing
a more permanent settlement, submitted their controversy to the King. See, e.g., Virginia
v. Tennessee, supra note 46, at 507, discussing the original North Carolina-Virginia border
controversy. This method, though binding on both parties, was extremely slow, and often
the lines drawn on the basis of antique charts and maps bore no relation to the actual lie
of the land. By the time the Revolution precluded recourse to the King, and left the states
even more free to abrogate agreements reached by negotiation, eleven of the thirteen
states were involved in border disputes. Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, supra note 45, at
723.
48. The problem existed, of course, of enforcing the judgments once made. Compare
Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66 (1861), with South Dakota v. North Carolina,
192 U.S. 286 (1904). See generally Powell, Coercing a State to Pay a Judgment: Virginia v.
West Virginia, 17 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1918); Coleman, The State as Defendant Under the
Federal Constitution: The Virginia-West Virginia Debt Controversy, 31 HARv. L. REV.
210 (1917); Long, Enforcement of Judgments Against a State, 4 VA. L. Rxv. 157 (1916).
49. The meaning of the Compacts Clause, it should be noted, is far from clear. See
Frankfurter & Landis, supra note 20, at 694. See Weinfeld, What Did the Framers of the
Federal Constitution Mean by "Agreements or Compacts"?, 3 U. CI. L. REv. 453, 461
(1936). See also Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, supra note 45, at 724. The Court stated that
to exclude boundary settlements from the subjects falling under "agreement or compact"
would be to render the Compacts Clause "a perfect nullity for all practical purposes."
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on the signatory nations by virtue of natural lawv. 0 The authors of the
Constitution drew the conclusion that interstate compacts, like treaties,
should be forever binding on the parties. By implication, Congress as
an outside party had no power to amend or repeal these "inviolable"
agreements.
An early illustration of the compact theory is Poole v. Fleeger, in
which the Court held that a state could bind itself by compact to dis-
regard its own prior land grant.0 1 The Court observed that the inde-
pendent states, like nations, had the inherent power to enter into
binding treaties.12 By authorizing Congress to approve compacts, the
50. See ScHwnma, THE LEGAL CozntuNrrY op l MfANK 30-31 (1954); Pufendorf and
Vattel, two international law theorists who followed Grotius, were known to the founding
fathers. PUFENDORF, DE JURE NATURAE Er GENTIUM MI, IV, I (Carnegie Endowment Ed.
1935); Wgeinfeld, supra note 49, at 458-60. The theory still has adherents. McNAn, TnE
LAw oF TRAnTms 493-94 (1961).
51. Poole v. Fleeger, 36 US. (11 Pet.) 145 (1837). Wilson v. Mason was the first case
to suggest how the Court would regard boundary compacts. Wilson v. Mason, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 28 (1801). See also other early cases dealing with interstate boundary compacts;
Burton's Lessee v. Williams, 16 US. (3 Wheat) 245 (1818); Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14
Pet.) 471 (1840).
Wilson involved a conflict over title to real property under Virginia law, which was to
govern the dispute according to the terms of the compact at issue. The crucial question
was whether the Supreme Court had the right to hear the appeal. Defendant argued the
Court had no such right on the grounds that the compact's reference to Virginia law
referred to the state's rules of judicial procedure, as well as to the substantive law of
real property. Virginia judiciary law made base line state court judgments in title disputes
nonreviewable; hence, defendant argued, judgments of base line federal courts whose
jurisdiction was based only on diversity should not be subject to review either. Chief
Justice Marshall rejected this argument with the Court's first employment of the "treaty"
model for interstate compacts:
This argument would not appear to be well founded, had Virginia and Kentucky even
been, for every purpose, independent nations; because the compact must be [inter-
preted] as providing for the preservation of titles, not of the tribunals which should
decide on those titles.
5 US. at 57. Marshall, however, did not end his analysis with this narrow finding. He
held that even
If ... the compact between Virginia and Kentucky was . .. susceptible of the con-
struction contended for, that construction could only be maintained, on the principle,
the legislatures of any two states might, by agreement between themselves, annul
the constitution of the United States.
Id. at 58.
Since the Constitution gave the Court and Congress control over appeals, said Marshall,
no agreement between states could dilute that control. He feared if the states could control
"procedural" rights in boundary cases, they could also manipulate those procedures in
order to decide the outcome with respect to substantive issues. The states, as a result,
would lose faith in the permanency and viability of the compact device. Marshall, ap-
parently intent on establishing federal supremacy, also had fears that this would dilute the
power of the Court.
52. Poole v. Fleeger, supra note 51, at 162.
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states had surrendered pro tanto their prior sovereign rights to enter
into treaties. But, said the Court, this congressional power was the
"single limitation or restriction"5 3 on the states' treaty-making power. 54
Once Congress gave its consent, the compacting states again stood to
each other as independent nations for the purpose of the compact-no
further interference, such as congressional amendment or repeal, was
authorized by the Constitution. 5
Although the Court's remarks were dicta, they would have been
a perfectly appropriate holding had Congress attempted to repeal a
boundary compact. When the nation was formed the states were con-
stantly embroiled in boundary disputes. The boundary compact was
an amicable method of settling these disputes; but it could be effective
only if the states bound themselves permanently. Had Congress been
given the power to amend or repeal, boundary compacts would have
been truces, not treaties.
Further, congressional repeal power was not essential to federal
supremacy. The federal judiciary remained the final arbiter of the
compact's terms. Congress had ample opportunity to review the im-
pact of any state agreement before voting approval, thus assuring that
federal interests would be taken into account. As boundaries are static,
53. Ibid.
54. Id. at 163 (Baldwin, J. concurring). Justice Baldwin's concurrence is interesting
because he was to speak for the Court in the next important compacts case and because
he added an argument based on close constitutional construction to support the conclusion
Congress had no power to revoke consent to interstate boundary compacts. First, Baldwin
noted that article I, § 10, clause 2, gave Congress, by the use of specific language, a con-
tinuing right to regulate state activities.
No state shall, without the consent of Congress, lay imposts or duties . . .and the
net proceeds of all duties and imposts . . . shall be for the use of the treasury of the
United States, and all such laws shall be subject to the revision and control of the
congress.
He concluded, then, that when the very next clause contained no such conditional
language,
No state shall, without the consent of congress . . . enter into any agreement or
compact with another state,
no conditions were intended to exist. Congress could either give consent or withhold It-
nothing more. Second, Baldwin observed that clause 2 was based on other Congressional
powers-those over commerce, taxation, etc.-whereas clause 3 had no collateral source of
authority in the Constitution and hence, he argued, it should be narrowly read:
The subject-matter is not within the jurisdiction of Congress . . . .The effect of
such consent is, that thenceforth, the compact has the same force as if It had been
made between states who are not confederated, or between the United States and a
foreign state ... or as if there had been no restraining provision In the constitution.
Id. at 165.
55. See also Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, supra note 45; Robinson v. Campbell, 16
U.S. (3 Wheat.) 100 (1818).
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it was unlikely that subsequent developments would produce unfore-
seen injury to federal interests.
But the Court's compact doctrine, aptly suited to an age of border
disputes, lingered on while new kinds of interstate agreements de-
veloped. The Court continued to speak the language of treaties and
restoration of sovereignty, thus leading commentators to suppose that
no compact could be repealed by Congress. °
B. The Modern Compact
The use of the interstate compact grew and changed with the nine-
teenth century,57 reflecting the broadened government interest in
commerce and economic development. Joint state action, charted in an
1825 compact, led to the construction of the Cheasapeake and Ohio
Canal.58 The complexity of territorial jurisdiction also provided a new
development in compacts; for example, New York and New Jersey
agreed in 1833 to permit service of process by either state on the waters
of the New York Harbor.59 Multi-state cooperation also developed in
conservation, so that one state would not destroy common resources.
Thus, Washington and Oregon agreed to preserve the fish stocks of
the Columbia River by compacting not to change their fishing codes
without the other state's consentG0
These nineteenth century compacts relied for their effectiveness on
conventional state powers, in fields such as process service, conserva-
tion, and road building. They used existing state agencies to reach
problems of relatively small scope. But even these limited agreements
were far removed from boundary compacts. Limited agreements in-
56. See, e.g., Virginia v. West Virginia, 246 US. 565, 592-93, 605 (1918); Hinderlider v.
La Plate Co., 304 U.S. 92, 106, 107 (1938) (citing Poole v. Fleeger, supra note 51 and Rhode
Island v. Massachusetts, supra note 45); West Virginia ex rel. Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22,
32 (1951) (citing Hinderlider v. La Plate Co., supra and Rhode Island v. Massachusetts,
supra). See Mora v. Torres, 113 F. Supp. 309 (D.P.R. 1953), aff'd sub. nom. Mora v. Mejias,
206 F.2d 377 (1st Cir. 1953), for an application of this idea to a "compact" between Puerto
Rico and the United States.
57. Boundary compacts continued to be executed; however, they bec-me less important.
See, e.g., Connecticut and Rhode Island Boundary Agreement of 1887, consented to by
Congress, Act of Oct. 12, 1878, 25 Stat. 553 (1888). Interstate compact cases continued to
arise also, though by the end of the 19th century they were so well-settled in principle that
they consumed little court time. See, e.g., Central R.R. v. Jersey City, 209 U.S. 473 (1908).
58. Act of March 3, 1825, 4 Stat. 101 (1825).
59. Act of June 28, 1834, 4 Stat. 708, 710-11 (1834). Similar pacts were concluded between
New Jersey and Delaware, Act of Jan. 24, 1907, 34 Stat. 858 (1907), and Mississippi and
Arkansas, Joint Resolution of Jan. 26, 1909, 35 Stat. 1161 (1909).
60. Act of April 8, 1818, 40 Stat. 515 (1918). Considerable litigation arose out of this
compact. Alsos v. Kendall, 111 Ore. 359, 227 Pac. 286 (1924); see also State v. Gates, 104
Ore. 112, 206 Pac. 863 (1922); State v. Belknap, 104 Wash. 221, 176 Pac. 5 (1918).
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volved a continuous interstate relationship, whose full significance
probably would not be apparent at the beginning. A dam-building
project might turn out to hamper federal developments downstream;
a bi-state agricultural agreement could become a hindrance to regional
marketing.61 Thus the dicta of the early Supreme Court decisions,
appropriate to the boundary compacts, became increasingly irrelevant
to the impact of the compact on the federal system.
C. The Independent Authority
In the twentieth century, neighboring states often encounter prob-
lems which demand continuous joint effort. Rather than leave these
problems to bilateral negotiation, the states have compacted to estab-
lish independent authorities, whose expansive powers and corporate
form are designed for operating flexibility.62 Typically, the authority's
powers include borrowing money and seeling services for profit. To
allow for expert planning and to exclude "political" influences, it is
freed from the pressures to which legislatures subject ordinary state
agencies.
The differences between an "authority" compact and a boundary
agreement are apparent.63 Instead of neatly solving a dispute, the au-
61. At first it appeared that the courts recognized the changing nature of these compacts
when they began to use contract theory in some cases to define the relationships among
compacting states.
In one example of this new kind of compacts case, Kentucky v. Indiana, 281 U.S. 163
(1930), the parties had agreed to build a bridge across the Ohio River. Both states began
performance, but Indiana reneged when a taxpayers' suit challenged Indiana's participa-
tion in the compact as ultra vires. Kentucky sued in the Supreme Court to restrain
"breach of contract," and asked for "specific performance." Id. at 169. The Court held
that it had the power to interpret the "obligation of contract" problems involved, and
decreed performance. Id. at 169. A similar case is South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192
U.S. 286 (1904).
In several early cases the Court had the opportunity to use contract language and
reasoning to decide boundary compacts cases. The Court consistently rejected that
language and reasoning as inappropriate. See, e.g., Burton v. Williams, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.)
244, 248 (1818); Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503, 518, 520, 523-24 (1893).
This application of contract theory to explain the new use of the Compacts Clause may
have been partially due to the increasing flow of contracts cases before the Supreme Court,
and to the growing national interests in commercial matters. But contract theory also was
an accurate reflection of the nature of the new kind of compact. The states were joining
together for mutual benefit through agreements which established mutual obligations, and
under which a variety of relationships were established: joint contributions to build a
bridge, or continuing rights to enter on certain lands.
62. See Leach, supra note 17, at 679; ZIMMERMANN & WEND.LL, op. cit. supra note 12.
63. While the independent authority agreements bear a family resemblance to the
limited agreement compacts described earlier, there are significant differences. "Contractual
agreements" were usually designed to fill a specific gap in state regulation and were conse-
quently narrow in scope. Such narrowness would destroy the whole purpose of independent
authority compacts, which must be as flexible and broad as the problems they are designed
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thority agreement creates a wealthy and powerful organization which
can expand its activities and repulse efforts at political control." De-
scribing the authority as a new political entity fits the powers held by
these authorities: the right to subpoena, investigate, pass regulations,
provide enforcement of rules and penalties for breach, raise money,
and condemn property. The courts have been accessories to the
expansion of authority power. They have, for example, allowed the
Port of New York Authority to raise the defense of sovereign im-
munity to a claim of illegal holding of fundsY In addition, the courts
have permitted the authorities to extend their power by making agree-
ments with the states without any congressional approval. 0
An interstate authority needs a permissive grant of power to do its
job. It could never build a bridge or sail a boat if it constantly had to
trek to Congress for approval. But by the same token, the authority's
flexibility makes it impossible for Congress to guage in advance the
impact of the authority on federal interests.07
Conflicts between regional authorities and federal interests are
to meet. Where limited agreements use existing state agencies, the authority compact creates
new ones, with functions far less restricted than state departments.
64. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 24-43.
65. Howell v. Port of New York Authority, 34 F. Supp. 797 (D.NJ. 1940). For the
limits of sovereign immunity, see New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946); Note,
66 HARV. L REv. 898, 904-06 (1953); Hardin, Executive Privilege in the Federal Courts, 71
YAIm L.J. 879 (1962). Independent authorities have also been relieved of the burdens of
local taxation. Cf. Commissioner v. Shanberg's Estate, 144 F.2d 998 (2d Cir. 1944), cert.
denied, 523 U.S. 792 (1945); Commissioner v. Vhite's Estate, 144 F.2d 1019 (1944); cf. also
Graves v. New York ex rel. O'Keefe, 306 U.S. 466 (1939); South Carolina v. United States,
199 U.S. 437 (1905).
66. E.g., in Courtesy Sandwich Shop v. Port of New York Authority, 12 N.Y.2d 379,
190 N.E.2d 402, appeal dismissed, 375 U.S. 78 (1963), the New York Court of Appeals held
that the compacting states had the right to expand the power of an independent authority
-in this case, to enter the real estate business-without the consent of Congress. The
implication of this case is that the states can tailor a compact to any new task which the
legislatures may find "necessary and proper," even if it turns the compact into something
different from that originally approved by Congress, with no subsequent congressional
control. But see Hogue v. Port of Seattle, 54 Wash. 2d 799, 341 P.2d 171 (1959); Opinion
of Justices to the Senate, 322 Mass. 769, 126 N.E.2d 795 (1955).
Another issue in Courtesy Sandwich Shop, also held for the Authority, was the right of
the Authority to invest in purely income-producing real estate ventures. There have been
twenty-six such state additions to Port Authority power in which Congress has not
concurred. Brief for Appellant, p. 6, Tobin v. United States, 306 F.2d 270.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has gone further than the New York courts in ex-
panding the powers of a compact authority. It held in Henderson v. Delawrare River
Joint Toll Bridge Comm'n, 362 Pa. 475, 66 A.2d 843, cert. denied, 338 U.S. 850 (1949),
that any one state could broaden the power of a compact within that state's borders
without approval either by Congress or the other compacting members.
67. Such criticisms have come from many sources. See, e.g., Dixon, Constitutional Bases
for Regionalism: Centralization; Interstate Compacts; Federal Regional Taxation, 33 GEo.
WAsm L. REv. 47, 72-78 (1964); Atlantic Monthly, Aug. 1959, p. 38.
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already visible.68 Transportation planning, for example is controlled by
the Port Authority throughout the New York Metropolitan region.
As cities become clogged with automobiles, Congress may want to
emphasize mass transportation and to discourage the car-oriented poli-
cies of the Port Authority. Alternatively, Congress may decide that
authorities have usurped planning and service functions which belong
on a local level. Remedial action would almost certainly require
amendment or even outright repeal of authority powers which Con-
gress initially approved.
The political irresponsibility of the authorities' regional planners
is another potential source of trouble. For years, critics have attacked
the philosophy of "objective" regional planning, free from the "taint"
of political influence. Congress might decide that there must be a
closer relationship between those who plan a community and those
who live in it. Such a decision would bring regional authorities squarely
within the sights of Congress, since the regional authorities are almost
totally divorced from community control. The people do not vote for
authority directors or officers, nor have they any direct method of
influence.
In none of these cases could Congress safeguard the interests at stake
through sophisticated provisos inserted into the compact at the time
of approval. Even if Congress were able to foresee jeopardy to federal
interests, it could not preclude all conflict without hamstringing the
agency.69 A system of checks and balances might curb political irrespon-
sibility, but it could also make flexible administration impossible. For
example, a requirement that capital budget items must be approved
by all member states, or that certain kinds of planning decisions be
subject to the governors' veto would interfere with business-like man-
agement. For Congress to be a judicious supervisor, it must have the
68. See, for an example of some potential and real abuses, Bolger v. Cleary, 293 F.2d 368
(2d Cir. 1961), rev'd, 371 U.S. 392 (1963). Contra, LAcH & Suco, op. cit. supra note 17, at
222-24. Of course, if possible, interference with compact authorities ought to be avoided.
They require some independence and authority to act effectively. See, e.g., BARD, op. cit.
supra note 23, at 35-63, 269-80 (1942). However, in some instances, it is felt, these require-
ments may be overridden. For example, The Missouri-Illinois Bi-State Development
Agency was paralyzed between 1953 and 1959 when the two states could not agree upon
proper remedial amendments to the compact's powers in order to make it effective In Its
changing spheres of activity. Other authorities have experienced the same problems.
See Leach, supra note 17, at 671-72; Dixon, supra note 67, at 74, 77.
69. Even when Congress has acted in an attempt to plan for the future the courts have
not always helped. An example in which the courts ignored the words of a compact is the
Tobin case. There the investigating committee based its investigatory power upon a clause
in the Port of New York Authorty compact which gave Congress the power to "alter,
amend or repeal." The court, however, ignored that clause and implied that despite Its
existence Congress had no power to repeal. Tobin v. United States, 306 F.2d 270.
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power to wait until a compact has taken shape, assess the consequences
to federal interests, and then, if necessary, act to halt abuse of the
compact. The crucial question is whether Congress has this power over
the regional authorities, either through the repeal device, or through
another mechanism of control.
III. TiH CASE FOR CONGRESSIONAL CONTROL
A. Continuing Federal Interests in Multi-State Compacts
The application of boundary compact law to independent authorities
has led some observers to conclude that Congress has no right to
amend or repeal a compact. One author, commenting on the Port
Authority agreement, contends:
Thus Congress apparently has only one function with respect
to compacts; to screen them before they become operative ....
[T]he very consent of Congress rendered the compact irrevocable,
since its effect was to remove the constitutional ban against the
formation of interstate compacts, thus restoring to the states the
inherent sovereignty they enjoyed prior to the Constitution.-0
These conclusions, evidently drawn directly from the theories of
the boundary agreements, ignore precedent as well as context. The Su-
preme Court has recognized that the federal interest in a multi-state
compact need not end when it is ratified. The Court's acknowledg-
ment of this continuing interest, coupled with the dramatic distinc-
tions between the older compacts and the new, indicates that the
doctrinal case against amendment or repeal is far weaker than some
commentators have suggested.
Long before the development of independent authority compacts,
the Court had suggested that Congress has a continuing interest in
any interstate agreement between states which has political repercus-
sions. For example, in Florida v. Georgia,71 a dispute over a boundary
compact, the United States Attorney General was permitted to inter-
vene against the wishes of both states, to raise issues neither party
wanted discussed. The Court permitted the intervention despite the
fact that it might have led to a settlement neither state wanted,
analogizing the litigation to a compact settlement of a boundary dis-
pute. In the latter instance, said the Court, Congress was given power
to approve those interstate agreements where it was necessary for the
federal government
70. Note, 31 FoRD rAm L. REv. 581, 585-86 (1963). See also Note, 8 Viu L Rr,. 237, 238
(1963).
71. Florida v. Georgia, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 502 (1854).
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to guard the rights and interests of the other states, and to prevent
any compact or agreement between any two states which might
affect injuriously the interests of the others.72
The Court felt that here the Attorney General should be heard as the
guardian of the federal interests.
While this case did not involve a right to amend or repeal, the
Court's emphasis on the need to safeguard federal interests is signifi-
cant. If that is the policy behind Congress' power to review interstate
compacts, it would be anomolous to tie Congress' hands in cases where
political consequences cannot be assessed at the time of approval. The
Supreme Court recognized this political function of congressional
power in Virginia v. Tennessee,73 where it declared that the Compacts
Clause applied to agreements which tended to produce an "increase
of political power in the states," and which were "attended with per-
manent inconvenience or public mischief."74 Beyond this, the Court
said that Congress could withhold judgment on a compact for several
years in order to assess its effects in operation. But if Congress can
supervise an agreement simply by delaying final approval, it should
be allowed to act promptly and still retain a measure of control.75
72. Id. at 519.
73. 148 U.S. 503 (1893).
74. Id. at 519-20.
75. Congress can, of course, refuse to approve a compact unless changes are made. But
this is seldom done. See Leach, Federal Government and Interstate Compacts, 29 FORDIZAM
L. Rav. 421, 429 (1961). Congress cannot, however, require a compact to contain a clause
contrary to the Constitution. Note, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1595 (1960). See also Hale, Unconsti-
tutional Conditions and Constitutional Rights, 35 COLUM. L. Rty. 821 (1935); Merrill,
Unconstitutional Conditions, 77 U. PA. L. REv. 879 (1929). This means that Congress
cannot require as a condition of approval that the compacting states yield a degree of
control to Congress which it is prohibited by the Constitution from having. So the mere
fact that Congress specifically puts into compacts a clause retaining for it the right to
"alter, amend or repeal," does not give it that right. Leach, supra at 438-40. See Coyle v.
Oklahoma, 221 U.S. 559 (1911).
The Supreme Court, it appears, has made another step toward holding that Congress
has effective power to repeal compacts by characterizing independent authority compacts
as acts of Congress. In Delaware River Joint Toll Bridge Comm'n v. Colburn, 810 U.S. 419
(1940), the Court considered a New Jersey Supreme Court decision that the Delaware
Commission-a "body politic" created by compact with the consent of Congress--was
obligated to pay consequential damages in addition to the fair market value of land It
took by eminent domain. The first issue before the Court was, however, whether the case
could be heard under the certiorari power. The Court wrote
In People v. Central Railroad, 12 Wall. 455, jurisdiction of this Court to review a
judgment of a state court construing a compact between states was denied on the
ground that the Compact was not a statute of the United States. . . .This decision
has long been doubted .. .and we now conclude that the construction of such a
compact sanctioned by Congress . . . involves a federal "title, right, privilege or
immunity" which . . .may be reviewed here on certiorari ...
Id. at 427. If this is considered a holding that an independent authority compact is a
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B. Enumerated Powers as a Method of Control
Whatever the doctrinal confusion over an independent right to
amend or repeal, Congress still retains its full enumerated powers. 70
The Supreme Court has made it clear that congressional assent to a
compact in no way estops the Congress from effectively undercutting
an agreement through ordinary legislation.
The power of Congress over compacts is illustrated by Pennsylvania
v. The Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co.77 Congress had approved a
Virginia-Kentucky compact under which a bridge had been built across
the Ohio River. Pennsylvania objected that the bridge as built violated
a term of the congressionally-approved compact, under which the river
was to remain open for commerce.7" The Supreme Court had agreed
in a prior case, and ordered the bridge either elevated to permit free
flow of commerce or destroyed. In response, Congress passed a bill
making the bridge part of an interstate postal road system. The bridge
company asked the Supreme Court to reform the original decree, and
the Court agreed, ignoring Pennsylvania's claims that the Congress
could not constitutionally revise a compact.
The question, said the Court was:
whether or not the compact can operate as a restriction upon the
congressional statute, and given that Congress can repeal its own duly enacted statutes, it
would appear Congress has the right to repeal the independent authority compact.
The assertion that Congress retains an interest in compacts after approval is further
supported by decisions which suggest that the Congress is the proper branch of government
to review authority compacts. For example, in Wolkstein v. Port of New York Authority.
178 F. Supp. 209 (D.N.J. 1959), a New Jersey district court held that Congress was the
branch with the principal interest in compacts. Refusing to uphold a bondholder's
complaint that Authority activities were beyond its legitimate powers, the court stated
first that the Authority was immune from such suit because it was a "political" body
performing "governmental functions." However, even had it not been, the court said, the
suit was beyond the authority of the judiciary.
In effect the plaintiff is asking a branch of the judicial department of the United
States to decide a purely political question and to intrude, by its judgment, into the
domain of legislative discretion which is exclusively delegated to the Congress by the
Constitution. The Court is without authority to accede to plaintiff's request.
Such a holding suggests that the Congress has some control over the Authority; for there
is little purpose in requiring a citizen to take a complaint to a body without power to
remedy that complaint. Id. at 214, 215.
76. Repeal or amendment through the operation of the enumerated powers would, of
course, create hardships for the bondholders and others who have relied upon what it had
been thought a compact authority would be permitted to do. However, the loss of revenue-
producing property and the curtailment of the right to perform certain tasks in certain
ways and possibilities investors have always faced whether they bought corporate bonds or
municipal ones. The vagaries of economic life can make an investment profitable at one
time and unprofitable at another, and the vagaries of political life can make government
blessings equally transient.
77. 59 US. (18 How.) 421 (1855).
78. Id. at 432.
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power of congress under the constitution to regulate commerce
among the several states? Clearly not. Otherwise congress and
two States would possess the power to modify and alter the con-
stitution itself.
7 9
The question in issue, of course, did not concern the "alteration of
the Constitution," but rather the claim that in approving the terms of
the compact, Congress had permanently delegated its right to legislate
on interstate commerce relative to the bridge. The answer here was
also "clearly not." To hold otherwise would have paralyzed Congress
in all fields where a sweeping federal policy might impair a compact's
operation in some way. While in this case a third-party state was
Congress' antagonist, the reasoning applies equally to compact revi-
sions against the wishes of the compacting states.
The enumerated powers put independent authorities within the
scope of congressional power. If, for example, a conservation compact
resulted in the destruction of timber preserves, Congress could simply
exercise its eminent domain power and take the forest land. Save for
the just compensation requirement, 0 there is no constitutional objec-
tion merely because the timber is within the ambit of an interstate
compact. Similarly, the commerce power would provide almost certain
justification for federal assumption of the Port Authority's duties,
were Congress to decide that federal, rather than regional, interests
must prevail in the operation of the nation's key harbor area.8'
79. Id. at 433. For some examples of the breadth of congressional powers under the
Commerce Clause see, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); United States v.
Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
80. There might be, however, some other restrictions upon the use of this power by
Congress. See, e.g., the following cases dealing with the Tenth Amendment's limitation
on the use of the power: Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement Dist. No. 1, 298
U.S. 518 (1986); Indian Motorcycle Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 570 (1931); Hopkins
Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Cleary, 296 U.S. 315 (1935). Perhaps there are also Due
Process considerations here. See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926); but see James v.
Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134 (1937).
81. The application of this analysis to the Port of New York Authority case,
Tobin v. United States, exposes what appears to be a typical misuse by the courts of these
precedents. As mentioned earlier, in that case a congressional subcommittee attempted to
subpoena the records of the Port of New York Authority. The director of the Authority,
Austin Tobin, was cited for contempt when he refused to comply with the subpoena.
The district court, in convicting Tobin for contempt of Congress, wrote that the
subcommittee had sought the information to discover if the Port of New York Authority
had exceeded the scope of the powers Congress had given it in 1922. United States v.
Tobin, 195 F. Supp. at 602. This statement seems to imply that the subcommittee viewed
Tobin's employer as an independent authority compact, which, since it had become
politically irresponsible, might be disciplined. This interpretation is borne out by the
facts. The investigation was initiated by New Jersey Congressmen precisely because the
Port Authority had ignored New Jersey interests which it was supposed, in part, to
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Seen in this light, Congress has ample authority to call any interstate
agency to account. 2 Old case law should not inhibit direct congres-
sional supervision over compacts through the enumerated powers.
represent. The district court apparently concurred in the judgment that the Authority
was an independent authority compact which, under the analysis given above, could be
repealed or amended by use of the enumerated powers by Congress. The court argued
that, since the Authority had an effect on interstate commerce, Congress had the power to
repeal the compact upon which it was based in order to regulate commerce. Id. at 605-603.
The court's reasoning is weakened, however, because it appealed to boundary compact
decisions to support its conclusion about an independent authority compact. Id. at 606.
The court appears, then, to have reached the right decision-that independent authority
compacts can be repealed-but on a ground which Congress had not urged at the
relevant hearing.
The Circuit Court, on the other hand, inclined to the opposite and faulty conclusion:
that such compacts cannot be repealed or amended. The court, though conceding that
Congress could through independent enumerated congressional powers, reach activities
which relate to interstate compacts, balked at holding that repeal or amendment itself
was proper. Tobin v. United States, 306 F.2d at 273. This holding, the court wrote, would
be constitutionally impermissible since in giving its consent to the compact Congress
restored the states to their "original sovereignty." Further, the court felt interstate boundary
compacts were beyond repeal or amendment by Congress. Id. at 273. The Circuit Court,
it is believed, improperly used reasons, cases, and the language of treaties, which apply to
interstate boundary compacts, to reach a conclusion about independent authority compacts.
At base, the New York Port Authority case was an attempt to bring political responsive-
ness to an independent authority which, the cases appear to hold, Congress might legiti-
mately repeal or amend with its enumerated powers. From this point of view, it is dear
Congress did possess the authority to subpoena the records involved.
82. Three policy objections are generally raised to a congressional power to repeal
compacts. First, it is charged that repeal would mean the end of the compacts device,
since if a complem and expensive authority might be terminated by a congressional act,
states would refuse to invest time, effort, and resources in a compact authority. This objec-
tion is substantial, however, only if the congressional power were used indiscriminately, or
if Congress decided to eliminate compacts generally. It assumes that the federal govern-
ment would abandon the techniques of persuasion, negotiation, and conciliation to ad-
vance federal interests. Regulation and control of business has not crushed American busi-
ness; nor have mergers been eliminated by the increasing scope of the anitrut laws.
Further, this objection underestimates the vitality of the American political process.
Should Congress define the limits of authority compacts, if regional problems persist,
there is no need to fear that the device will fall into disuse.
The second objection to the repeal power is that it will impair federal-state harmony. To
say this, however, is to say only that the power might be used where Congress felt that
federal policy goals were more important than the frictions resulting from the implementa-
tion of that policy. Congress is confronted with conflicting interests each time it legislates.
The answer to potentially controversial decisions is not to hold that Congress is to be
deprived of a tool of policy-making.
Third, it is alleged that repeal of compacts would lead to political stagnation. If all
policies and programs begun by the states must conform to federal standards, diversity
and experimentation on the state level will cease. But this again assumes that the existence
of a power will automatically produce the extreme exercise of it. Congress presumably will
want -to encourage compacts which reflect creative responses to pressing regional needs
and will act only where there is an overriding federal interest. It no more follows that
a right of repeal will lead to conformity than it does that the congressional right to
impeach a President leads to slavish and timid executive action.
1966] 1433
